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Background. The time delay between the start of an influenza pandemic and its subsequent initiation in other countries is
highly relevant to preparedness planning. We quantify the distribution of this random time in terms of the separate
components of this delay, and assess how the delay may be extended by non-pharmaceutical interventions. Methods and
Findings. The model constructed for this time delay accounts for: (i) epidemic growth in the source region, (ii) the delay until
an infected individual from the source region seeks to travel to an at-risk country, (iii) the chance that infected travelers are
detected by screening at exit and entry borders, (iv) the possibility of in-flight transmission, (v) the chance that an infected
arrival might not initiate an epidemic, and (vi) the delay until infection in the at-risk country gathers momentum. Efforts that
reduce the disease reproduction number in the source region below two and severe travel restrictions are most effective for
delaying a local epidemic, and under favourable circumstances, could add several months to the delay. On the other hand, the
model predicts that border screening for symptomatic infection, wearing a protective mask during travel, promoting early
presentation of cases arising among arriving passengers and moderate reduction in travel volumes increase the delay only by
a matter of days or weeks. Elevated in-flight transmission reduces the delay only minimally. Conclusions. The delay until an
epidemic of pandemic strain influenza is imported into an at-risk country is largely determined by the course of the epidemic
in the source region and the number of travelers attempting to enter the at-risk country, and is little affected by non-
pharmaceutical interventions targeting these travelers. Short of preventing international travel altogether, eradicating
a nascent pandemic in the source region appears to be the only reliable method of preventing country-to-country spread of
a pandemic strain of influenza.
Citation: Caley P, Becker NG, Philp DJ (2007) The Waiting Time for Inter-Country Spread of Pandemic Influenza. PLoS ONE 2(1): e143. doi:10.1371/
journal.pone.0000143
INTRODUCTION
The emergence of a pandemic strain of influenza is considered
inevitable [1]. Provided the emerged strain is not too virulent, it
may be possible to eliminate a nascent influenza pandemic in the
source region via various combinations of targeted antiviral
prophylaxis, pre-vaccination, social distancing and quarantine
[2,3]. If early elimination in the source region is not achieved, then
any delay in a local epidemic that a country can effect will be
highly valued. To this end, countries may consider introducing
non-pharmaceutical interventions such as border screening, pro-
moting early presentation of cases among arriving passengers,
requiring the use of personal protective equipment during travels
(e.g. the wearing of masks), and reducing traveler numbers. While
the case for believing that measures such as these can not stop the
importation of an epidemic from overseas has been argued
strongly, whether it be SARS or influenza [4–6], the extent to
which such interventions delay a local epidemic is currently not
well quantified, and hence of considerable interest.
In this paper we demonstrate how the delay to importation of
an epidemic of pandemic strain influenza may be quantified in
terms of the growing infection incidence in the source region,
traveler volumes, border screening measures, travel duration, in-
flight transmission and the delay until an infected arrival initiates
a chain of transmission that gathers momentum. We also
investigate how the delay is affected by the reproduction number
of the emerged strain, early presentation of cases among arriving
passengers, and reducing traveler numbers. As noted in previous
simulation modeling [7], many aspects of this delay have
a significant chance component, making the delay a random
variable. Therefore, the way to quantify the delay is to specify its
probability distribution, which we call the delay-distribution.
Some issues of the delay distribution, such as the natural delay
arising in the absence of intervention and the effect that reducing
traveler numbers has on this delay has been studied previously [6–
8]. Specifically, if the originating source is not specified, and
homogeneous mixing of the worlds population is assumed, then
the most likely time to the initial cases arising in the United States
is about 50 days assuming R0=2.0 [7]. The additional delay
arising from travel restrictions appears minimal until a.99%
reduction in traveler numbers [6–8].
This paper adds to previous work [5–8] by simultaneously
including a wider range of epidemiological factors and possible
interventions, such as elevated in-flight transmission, flight
duration, the effect of wearing of mask during flight, early
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passengers from a flight with a detected case at arrival.
METHODS
General
Consider a region in which a new pandemic strain of influenza has
emerged, and a region currently free from the infection. We refer
to these as the source region and the at-risk country, respectively.
Travel between these countries is predominantly via commercial
air travel and/or rapid transport which could potentially be
subject to border screening and other interventions. We restrict
our discussion to air travel. The aim is to assess the effects that
a variety of non-pharmaceutical border control measures have,
individually and in combination, on the time it takes before the
epidemic takes off in the at-risk country. An epidemic is said to
have ‘‘taken off’’ when it reaches 20 current infectious cases, after
which its growth is highly predictable (i.e. nearly deterministic) and
the probability of fade-out by chance is very low, if intervention is
not enhanced. The source country of origin will undoubtedly have
a large impact on the natural delay until importation of an
epidemic, although this is difficult to quantify [7]. An alternative is
to fix the originating city, for example a highly connected city such
as Hong Kong [6], with the obvious effect that results are highly
dependent on the choice. We adopt no specific source region, but
assume that the number of international travelers originating from
it is reasonably small (see Methods), suggestive of a rural or semi-
rural source region [2]. It is further assumed that the current
heightened surveillance for pandemic influenza is continued and
that a nascent pandemic with human-to-human transmission is
identified and the pandemic is declared when there are 10
concurrent cases in the source region.
For an epidemic to take off in an at-risk country, a series of
events need to occur. First, the epidemic needs to get underway in
the source region. Second, an intending traveler needs to be
infected shortly before departure. Third, the infected traveler must
actually travel and successfully disembark in the at-risk country.
Fourth, the infected traveler, or fellow travelers infected during the
flight, must initiate an epidemic in the at-risk country with the
infectiousness that remains upon arrival. Finally, the epidemic
needs to reach a sufficient number of cases to begin predictable
exponential growth.
Infected travelers
International spread of the emerged pandemic strain of influenza
may occur when a recently infected person travels. By ‘recently
infected’ we mean that their travel is scheduled to occur within ten
days of being infected. We assume that the number of individuals
traveling from the source region to the at-risk country each day is
known. The probability that a randomly selected traveler is
a recently-infected person is taken to be equal to the prevalence of
recently-infected people in the source region on that day. The
incidence of infection in the source region is assumed to grow
exponentially initially, with the rate of exponential growth
determined by the disease reproduction number (the mean
number of cases a single infective generates by direct contact)
and the serial interval (the average interval from infection of one
individual to when their contacts are infected) (Figure 1A).
The time since infection of a recently-infected traveler is a key
component of the calculations, because it affects the chance of
positive border screening, the chance of in-flight transmission and
the infectivity remaining upon arrival in the at-risk country. The
time since infection at the time of scheduled departure is random
and the dependence of its probability distribution on the
exponential growth rate of infection is illustrated by Figure 1B
(see also Supporting Information). The higher the epidemic
growth rate in the source region, the greater the probability than
an infected traveler will have been infected more recently.
Traveler screening at departure
It is assumed that individuals detected by departure screening are
prevented from traveling. To be detected by screening an infected
traveler must be symptomatic and positively screened. An
individual is assumed to become symptomatic 48 hours after
being infected (cf. [3] who use 1.9 days). The probability of being
symptomatic when presenting for departure screening is computed
from the curve in Figure 1B. The distribution of the time since
infection immediately after departure screening, given that the
infected traveler was not detected, is given by the curve in
Figure 1C. It contains an adjustment for the probability of being
detected at departure.
In-flight transmission
The instantaneous rate at which susceptible contacts are infected
depends on the time since infection, and is described by an
infectiousness function ([9], page 45). We use a peaked in-
fectiousness function, motivated by viral shedding and household
transmission data [2], which has a serial interval of 2.6 days. The
basic reproduction number (R0), namely the reproduction number
when there is no intervention in place and every contacted
individual is susceptible, is given by the area under the
infectiousness function. However, our concern is with the effective
reproduction number R that holds when various interventions are
in place. We obtain any R by simply multiplying the infectiousness
function by the appropriate constant (to make the area under the
curve equal to R). This keeps the serial interval the same. In the
absence of suitable data we assume for most scenarios that the
aircrafts ventilation and filtration systems are functioning properly,
and that infected travelers transmit the infection at the same rate
during a flight as they would while mixing in the community. We
examine the sensitivity of this assumption by increasing the in-
flight transmission by as much as 10-fold (as could potentially
happen if air-circulation and filtration systems malfunction, e.g.
see [10]). The in-flight transmission rate is set to zero under the
optimistic scenario that all travelers wear 100% effective masks
during transit. In terms of a sensitivity analysis this illustrates what
would be achievable in a best-case scenario. The number of
offspring that an infected traveler infects during a flight is a random
variable, taken to have a Poisson distribution with a mean equal to
the area under the infectiousness function over to the flight
duration.
Traveler screening at arrival
Travelers infected during flights of less than 12 hours duration are
asymptomatic at arrival and will not be detected by screening. The
probability that an arriving traveler who was infected in the source
region is detected on arrival is computed from the distribution of
the time since infection on arrival. This distribution is obtained
from the curve in Figure 1C by shifting it to the right by an
amount equal to the duration of the flight. The distribution of the
time since infection for an individual infected in the source region,
who passes through arrival screening undetected has a further
adjustment for the chance of being detected at arrival (Figure 1D).
This curve shows that an infected traveler who escapes detection at
departure and arrival is highly likely to enter the at-risk country
with most, or all, of their infectious period remaining.
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options when detecting an infected traveler by arrival screening.
Under option one (individual-based removal), all passengers who
test negative are released immediately and only passengers who
test positive are isolated. Under the second option (flight-based
quarantining), authorities prevent all passengers from dispersing
into the community until the last person has been screened from
that flight. Should any one passenger be detected as infected then
all passengers will be quarantined, as previously recommended [5].
Transmission chains initiated by infected arrivals
Transmission chains can be initiated in the at-risk country by
infected travelers who mix within the community upon arrival.
Suppose now that a flight arrives with one, or more, infected
passengers who mix within the community. We classify these
infected arrivals into those who are ‘pre-symptomatic’ and those
who are ‘symptomatic’ at entry. It is assumed that the
‘symptomatic’ infected arrivals do not recognize their symptoms
as pandemic influenza and will not present to medical authorities.
In other words, they spend the remainder of their infectious period
mixing in the community. On the other hand, the ‘pre-
symptomatic’ infected arrivals, including all individuals infected
during flight, are assumed to mix freely in the community only
from entry until they present to medical authorities after some
delay following the onset of symptoms.
Probability that an undetected infected traveler
initiates a major epidemic
Not all infected travelers entering the community initiate a ‘major’
epidemic, even when the reproduction number (R) exceeds one.
Quite generally, the distribution of the size of an epidemic initiated
by an infected arrival is bimodal, with distinct peaks corresponding
to a major epidemic and a minor outbreak (Figure 1E). In the
latter event the outbreak simply fades out by chance despite there
being ample susceptibles in the population for ongoing trans-
Figure 1. The process through which a pandemic is imported. (A) The prevalence in the source region, which determines the probability that
a randomly selected traveler is infected at scheduled departure. (B)–(D) Density functions of the time since infection during the early stages of the
epidemic in the source region for infected travelers (B) before and (C) after departure screening, and (D) after arrival screening for clinical symptoms.
In (B), the step illustrates the probabilistic removal of travelers who have completed their incubation period. In (D), the distribution of time since
infection in (C) will have shifted to the right by an amount equal to the flight duration, and cases incubated in-flight may be detected by
symptomatic screening, as will those symptomatic cases that were not detected previously. Screening sensitivity for this illustration is 60% on both
departure and arrival. (E) Upon entering the community undetected, an infected traveler may initiate a minor (inconsequential) or major epidemic,
depending on the characteristics of the disease and public health policy.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0000143.g001
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typically very small compared to an epidemic.
The probability that a typical infective generates a local
epidemic is computed by using a branching process approximation
[12] for the initial stages of the epidemic, and equating ‘epidemic’
with the event that the branching process does not become extinct.
This calculation is well known (e.g. [13], page 473), but is modified
here to allow for the fact that the process is initiated by a random
number of infected arrivals and some of them have spent a random
part of their infectious period before arriving in the at-risk country.
The distribution for the random number of individuals infected by
an infected individual when all their contacts are with susceptible
individuals is needed for the calculation. The lack of data prevents
a definitive conclusion for the most appropriate offspring
distribution for influenza transmission [14], and we use a Poisson
distribution with a mean equal to R, discounted for individuals
who spent only some of their infectious period mixing in the at-risk
country. A Poisson offspring distribution is appropriate when the
area under the infectiousness function is non-random (i.e. all
individuals have the same infection ‘potential’). We assume that R
is the same in the source region and the at-risk country. For an
undetected infected traveler and all their in-flight offspring to fail
to initiate an epidemic on arrival, all of the chains of transmission
they initiate must fail to become large epidemics (see Supporting
Information).
The delay until an epidemic gathers momentum in
the at-risk country
We calculate the probability distribution of D, the total delay until
an epidemic gathers momentum by noting that it is given by
D=D1+D2, where D1 is the time until an epidemic is first initiated
and D2 is the time from initiation until the local epidemic gathers
momentum. For an epidemic to be first initiated in the at-risk
country on day d, it must have not been initiated on all previous
days. Hence the probability distribution of the time delay (D1) until
the epidemic is first initiated in the at-risk country following
identification in the source region is described by:
Pr(D1~d)~ p p1 p p2 p p3::: p pd{1pd
where pd denotes the probability that the epidemic is initiated on
day d , and p pd~1{pd denotes the probability that the epidemic is
not initiated on day d (see Supporting Information for calculation of
pd).
Once successfully initiated, an epidemic may initially hover
around a handful of cases before reaching a sufficient number of
cases for its growth to become essentially predictable. As
mentioned, 20 concurrent cases is our criterion for an epidemic
to have gathered momentum. We determine the distribution of D2,
the time to this occurrence, from 10,000 stochastic simulations and
approximate this empirical distribution by a shifted gamma
distribution. Our criterion of 20 concurrent cases is conservatively
high, as results from the theory of branching processes shows that
the probability of a minor epidemic (and hence no take-off)
starting from 20 concurrent cases is about 3610
28 when R=1.5,
and even smaller for higher values of R. Finally, the distribution of
the total delay (D=D1+D2) from the pandemic being identified in
the source region until 20 cases in the at-risk country was
calculated by the convolution of the distributions of D1 and D2.
Parameter values
For the illustrative purposes, we chose values of 1.5, 2.5 and 3.5 for
R, which encompass estimates proposed for previous pandemics
[2,3,15]. The number of people within the infected source region
was assumed reasonably small (5 million), and there was one flight
per day traveling from the source region to the at-risk country
carrying 400, 100 or 10 passengers. A higher number of travelers
affects the delay only marginally, assuming the epidemic takes off
in the source region (see Results). We assume a typical travel
duration between attempted departure and possible arrival of
12 hours, but also examine the effect of varying this from 0–
48 hours. The time to presentation following symptom onset is
varied from ‘immediately’ to ‘never presenting’, with a time of
6 hours considered likely in the presence of an education
campaign. The sensitivity of symptomatic screening is varied from
0–100%, with results presented for 0, 50 and 100% sensitivity.
RESULTS
Evading traveler screening
The probability that a recently infected traveler evades screening is
substantial even if screening reliably detects symptomatic travelers
(Figure 2A), because the typical travel duration is shorter than the
2-day incubation period. In addition, during the early stages of the
epidemic a high R in the source region acts to increase the
probability that an infected traveler has been infected quite
recently and hence will escape detection due to being asymptom-
atic during their travels (Figure 2A). For example, assuming 100%
sensitivity for detecting symptomatic infection, we calculate that
during the early stages of the epidemic the proportion of infected
travelers that evade both departure and arrival screening after
12 hours of travel is 0.26, 0.45 and 0.59 for disease reproduction
numbers 1.5, 2.5 and 3.5, respectively.
As the duration of travel approaches the disease incubation
period, effective symptomatic screening substantially reduces the
likelihood that a traveler evades screening and initiates an
epidemic (Figure 2B). Reducing the time from the onset of
symptoms to presentation (and subsequent isolation) for each
infected arrival also reduces the probability that a major epidemic
is initiated, however the best case scenario of infected travelers and
all their in-flight offspring presenting immediately following the
onset of symptoms still poses a substantial risk of epidemic
initiation arising from pre-symptomatic transmission (Figure 1C).
The time until an epidemic gathers momentum in
the at-risk country
The delay contains a fairly substantial natural component,
primarily due to the time it takes to increase the number of
infectives in the source region sufficiently to make the chance of
a recently infected traveler appreciable (Figure 3A), and the time
(D2) it takes for a local epidemic in the at-risk country to gather
momentum following successful seeding (Figure 4A). In the
absence of any interventions, the number of infected individuals
who successfully enter the community of the at-risk country
initially increases exponentially (Figure 3A). With individual-based
removal of infected travelers, the number of individuals entering
the at-risk country undetected by screening is proportionately
reduced over the course of the epidemic (Figure 3A). With flight-
based quarantining, the number of infected individuals entering
the at-risk country undetected is dramatically reduced over the
course of the epidemic, even for relatively insensitive screening
(Figure 3A). With flight-based quarantining, the number of
infected passengers slipping through undetected is bimodal, with
the first peak occurring when the number of infected travelers
attempting to travel is still in single figures.
Without screening, the daily probability that an epidemic is
initiated (pd) increases, and becomes near certain once the number
Delaying Pandemic Importation
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(Figure 3B, solid line). With screening and individual-based
removal of infected individuals, pd follows a similar pattern only
reduced somewhat. With screening in combination with flight-
based quarantining, this probability is changed dramatically. After
an initial rise it dips, to become essentially zero during the height
of the epidemic in the source region (Figure 3B, dotted line). This
arises because once a flight has several infected travelers, the
probability that at least one is detected approaches one (even if
screening is imperfect), and all passengers on such a flight are
quarantined. Once the epidemic starts to wane in the source
region (assuming the unlikely event of the pandemic strain is
restricted to the source region), the probability of initiation rises
once again. The corresponding distribution of D1, the delay until
Figure 2. Effects of border screening and early presentation. (A) The
effects of screening sensitivity andon the probability of escaping
detection on both departure and arrival during a 12 hour transit. (B) The
effects of screening sensitivity and travel duration on the probability
than an infected traveler escapes detection during transit and initiates
an epidemic after arrival (assuming no other symptomatic individuals
on the same flight are identified). R=3.5 with no early presentation. (C)
The effects of R and the time from symptom onset to presentation on
the probability that an infected traveler, having entered the wider
community following arrival, will initiate an epidemic. There is no
screening.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0000143.g002
Figure 3. Components of delay until initiation and effects of border
screening. (A) The number of infected people successfully arriving and
entering the community of an at-risk country (KA) on each day following
the identification of an outbreak of pandemic type strain influenza,
assuming a source region population of 5 million, 400 intending
travelers per day, R=1.5, and three levels of symptomatic screening
(solid line=nil, dashed line=50% sensitivity with individual-based
removal, dotted line=50% sensitivity with flight-based quarantining).
(B) Corresponding daily probability of initiation (pd) as a function of
time since pandemic identified. (C) Distribution of the delay time until
the initiation (D1) of an epidemic in an at-risk country by an infected
traveler from a source region.
Figure 4. Components of the delay in at-risk country following
initiation. (A) Results of 10,000 simulations (bars) and fitted shifted-
Gamma distribution of delay time (D2) until 20 concurrent cases occur
in the at-risk country, given that an epidemic has been initiated,
andequals 1.5 with a serial interval of 2.6 days. (B) The total delay
distribution until there are 20 concurrent cases in the at-risk country
from when a pandemic type strain of influenza outbreak is identified in
a source region with a population of 5 million, 400 intending travelers
day
21, an R of 1.5, and three levels of symptomatic screening (solid
line=nil, dashed line=50% sensitivity with individual removal, dotted
line=50% sensitivity with flight-based quarantining).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0000143.g004
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the presence of screening (Figure 3C).
Although flight-based quarantining is effective in preventing the
entry of infected travelers during the height of the epidemic,
a substantial cumulative risk of initiation has already occurred
before this from the handful of infectives that have slipped through
undetected (Figure 3B). Hence, whilst the effect of border
screening, particularly in conjunction with flight-based quarantin-
ing, on the daily probability of initiation is dramatic, its effect on
the delay to initiation is much less pronounced (Figure 3C). Border
screening, even with perfect sensitivity for detecting symptomatic
cases, tends to increase D1, the time to an epidemic being initiated,
by a matter of days to weeks. The time (D2) from initiation (the
arrival of the index case) to an epidemic reaching 20 concurrent
cases within the at-risk country is adequately modeled using
a shifted Gamma distribution (Figure 4A). The convolution of this
right-skewed Gamma distribution with the left-skewed delay-
distribution of D1 (Figure 3C) yields the distribution for D, the total
delay until the epidemic reaches 20 cases in the at-risk country
(Figure 4B). The distribution of D is approximately symmetrical.
The effect of border screening on the total delay D is quite modest,
though sensitive to how screening is implemented. For example,
with R=1.5 and 400 travelers per day, 100% sensitive screening
with individual-based removal increases the median delay from 57
to 60 days (Figure 4B). Flight-based quarantining would extend
the median delay to 70 days. In general, the added delay arising
from flight-based quarantining is about four-fold that arising from
individual-based removal.
The natural component of the delay is highly sensitive to the
disease reproduction number (Figure 5A). For example, with 400
passengers per day departing the source country and in the
absence of any interventions, the median delay ranges from a low
of 17 days for R=3.5 to 57 days for R=1.5 (Table 1). The delay is
less sensitive to the number of intending travelers, with little
appreciable increase in the median delay occurring until traveler
numbers become very low (Figure 5B). For example, if R=1.5,
with no other border control measures, decreasing the number of
intending travelers departing the source region from 400 to 100
per day increases the median total delay D from 57 to 66 days. A
further decrease in the number of intending travelers to 10 per day
increases the median delay to 83 days (Table 1).
The delay is quite insensitive to the rate of transmission in-flight.
For example, with R=1.5, a 12-hour flight, 400 travelers per day
and no other interventions, preventing in-flight transmission
altogether increases the median delay from 57 to 58 days.
Conversely, doubling the rate of in-flight transmission reduces
the median delay from 57 to 56 days. A 10-fold increase in the rate
of transmission in-flight only decreases the median delay from 57
to 53 days. Encouraging the early presentation of cases among
travelers following the onset of symptoms has a limited effect on
the delay distribution (Figure 5C). For example, for R=1.5, 400
intending travelers per day and no other interventions, reducing
the time to presentation from ‘never presenting’ to 6 hours
increases the median delay from 57 to 61 days. Immediate
presentation at symptom onset only increases the median delay
a further day in this scenario.
In general, the additional delay achieved by introducing non-
pharmaceutical border control measures is generally small in
comparison with the natural delay (Figure 5D). For the scenario
with R=1.5 and 400 intending travelers per day, a combination of
100% flight-based quarantining, 100% compliance with mask
wearing during travel and immediate presentation at symptom
Figure 5. Effects of interventions on the total delay D. (A) The effects of R on delay-distribution. (B) The effects of daily traveler number on the median
delay for different values of R. (C) The effects of the time from symptom incubation until presentation and isolation (tSP) on the delay-distribution. (D)
Additive effects of implementing 100% sensitive border screening (individual removal), the wearing of masks during transit, immediate presentation
following symptom onset, and flight-based quarantining on the median delay, assuming 400 travelers per day attempting to depart the source
region.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0000143.g005
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(Figure 5D). This added delay diminishes in absolute terms as R
increases. For example, if the same interventions are applied with
R=3.5, the median delay is extended from 17 to just 20 days
(Figure 5D). The one exception to this generalisation is when
travel numbers are reduced dramatically. The added delay
achieved when a drastic reduction in travel numbers is combined
with other border control measures appears to be greater than
adding the delays each achieves on its own. For example, if
R=1.5, and we reduce the number of intending travelers from 400
to 10 per day, implement 100% flight-based quarantining,
implement compulsory mask wearing during travel and pre-
sentation at 6 hours following symptom onset then there is
a substantial probability (0.74) that the pandemic strain will never
be imported (assuming the epidemic is confined to the source
country). The estimated quartile delay (the median in this case is
undefined) to the start of a major epidemic in an at-risk country is
extended from 50 to 125 days. Again, the added delay decreases
rapidly as R increases, and if the above interventions were applied
with R=3.5, the estimated median delay is extended from 17 to
26 days, and the importation of the epidemic is certain (Figure 5D).
DISCUSSION
We have formulated a model of the importation of an infectious
disease from a source region to an at-risk country that permits
a comprehensive analysis of the effect of border control measures.
Our results are most relevant to the early stage of a pandemic
when most cases are contained within a single source region. Once
the pandemic has spread to several countries, models with greater
complexity and ability to more realistically model global mixing
patterns [6–8] are required. Our model is developed with
a pandemic-strain of influenza in mind, but could apply to any
emerging infectious disease that is transmitted from person to
person. We have assumed a Poisson distribution for the number of
secondary infections, which a natural choice when each infected
individual has the same infectivity profile. A distribution with
a larger variance is appropriate when individuals vary substantially
in their infectiousness. Our results are conservative in the sense
that they give an upper bound for the probability that an infected
traveler manages to initiate an epidemic, compared to an offspring
distribution with a greater variance but the same reproduction
number [14].
The nature of the next pandemic influenza virus, and
particularly its reproduction number, is uncertain. If its re-
production number is low (R,2.0), our results indicate that at-risk
countries receiving a reasonably small number of travelers (say 400
per day) from the infected source region can expect a natural delay
until importing an epidemic of the order of 2 months. This is quite
variable and under favourable conditions it could be 4 months.
However, the natural delay decreases rapidly as R increases.
The additional delay from isolating individuals detected by
border screening is merely a few days under most plausible
scenarios, even if both departure and arrival screening is
introduced and screening detects every symptomatic traveler.
While the extra delay is more than quadrupled if flights with
a detected case(s) are quarantined, the effect remains modest
(weeks at most) and it is questionable whether the extra delay
achieved warrants the disruption created by such a large number
of quarantined passengers.
In-flight transmission is a commonly raised concern in
discussions about the importation of an infection, so inclusion of
in-flight transmission is an attractive feature of our model. Events
of substantial in-flight transmission of influenza have been
documented [10,16] and modeling of indoor airborne infection
risks in the absence of air filtration predicts that in-flight
transmission risks are elevated [17]. However, it difficult to
estimate the infectiousness of influenza in a confined cabin space,
as there is undoubtedly substantial under-reporting of influenza
cases who travel and fail to generate any offspring during flight.
Provided the aircraft ventilation system (including filtration) is
operational, it is considered that the actual risk of in-flight
transmission is much lower than the perceived risk [18]. Our
results indicate that the delay is relatively insensitive to the rate of
in-flight transmission, making in-flight transmission less of an issue
than commonly believed. A highly elevated transmission rate in-
flight will hasten the importation of an epidemic only marginally.
Consistent with this, eliminating in-flight transmission by wearing
protective masks increases the delay only marginally.
Early presentation by infected arrivals not detected at the
borders was found to add only a few days to the delay. To some
extent this arises due to our assumption that pre-symptomatic
transmission can occur, for which there is some evidence. In
contrast, Ferguson et al. [2] assume that the incubation and latent
periods are equal, with a mean of 1.5 days. In their model pre-
symptomatic transmission is excluded and infectiousness is
estimated to spike dramatically immediately following symptom
onset and declining rapidly soon afterwards. Under their model
assumptions, immediate presentation at onset of symptoms would
reduce transmission effectively. However, as presentation occurs
some time after onset of symptoms and the bulk of infectivity
occurs immediately after onset of symptoms the results on the
effect of early presentation of cases are likely, in practical terms, to
be similar to those found here. Given the variable nature of
influenza symptoms, there is likely to be a difference between the
onset of the first symptoms as measured in a clinical trial (e.g. [19])
and the time that a person in the field first suspects that they may
be infected with influenza virus. To fully resolve the issue of how
effective very early presentation of infected travelers is in delaying
a local epidemic we need better knowledge about the infectious-
ness of individuals before and just after the onset of symptoms.
Table 1. Summary measures of the expected time until an
epidemic of pandemic strain influenza in an at-risk country
reaches 20 cases, for three values of R and three values for the
number of intending travelers when the source region
contains 5 million people.
......................................................................
R
Intending travelers
(per day) 5
th Percentile Median 95
th percentile
1.5 10 63 83 103
100 47 66 85
400 38 57 76
2.5 10 26 34 41
100 20 27 35
400 17 24 31
3.5 10 19 24 28
100 15 20 24
400 12 17 22
It is assumed that the pandemic is identified and declared when there are 10
concurrent cases in the source region attributed to human-to-human
transmission, and that screening is applied at both departure and arrival. The
time between screening events is assumed to be 12 hours and infected
travelers are not isolated following the onset of symptoms.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0000143.t001
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PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 7 January 2007 | Issue 1 | e143Of the border control measures available, reducing traveler
numbers has the biggest effect on the delay and even then it is
necessary to get the number of travelers down to a very low
number. An equivalent control measure is to quarantine all
arriving passengers with near perfect compliance.
Our results indicate that short of virtually eliminating in-
ternational travel, border control measures add little to avoiding,
or delaying, a local epidemic if an influenza pandemic takes off in
a source region. All forms of border control are eventually
overwhelmed by the cumulative number of infected travelers that
attempt to enter the country. The only way to prevent a local
epidemic is to rapidly implement local control measures that bring
the effective reproduction number in the local area down below 1,
or to achieve rapid elimination in the source region, in agreement
with other recent studies [6–8]. Preventing the exponential growth
phase of an epidemic in the source region appears to be the only
method able to prevent a nascent influenza pandemic reaching at-
risk countries.
SUPPORTING INFORMATION
Text S1 Estimating the daily probability of epidemic initiation
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0000143.s001 (0.08 MB
PDF)
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